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Federal and state governments have leaned on technology companies to provide an ever-
increasing range of core government activities—from the use of algorithmic decision-making in
the criminal justice system to powerful surveillance technologies to providing the government’s
core information infrastructures.  As privately owned companies continue to become intricately
involved in many areas of governance, courts should recognize a First Amendment right of
access to certain information held by these companies in order to ensure that citizens’ long-
enjoyed right to obtain information about their government and to hold power accountable
remains viable in an era in which private actors exert signi cant control over our civil liberties.
Expanding the First Amendment’s right of access would be a radical and robust measure and one
that would directly disrupt the disturbingly asymmetrical power dynamics exerted by private
entities. By ensuring citizens’ right to knowledge and self-government in the digital age this
measure would ensure that the government could not obfuscate civil rights and civil liberties
violations or evade general accountability by operating through privately owned proxies.
The right of access as a means of ensuring government transparency has strong roots in the
American legal tradition. In 1961, legal scholar Alexander Meiklejohn argued that democracy
depends on a citizen’s ability to obtain information necessary for self-governance and that the
First Amendment is intended to ensure this structural protection for democracy.  Noted scholars
like Thomas Emerson have found support for this conception in the writings of James Madison,
author of the First Amendment. Madison famously asserted that “[a] popular government,
without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a
tragedy; or perhaps both.”  Supreme Court Justice William Brennan also referred to this
Madisonian principle in a famous right of access opinion that highlighted the right’s “structural
role . . . in securing and fostering our republican system of self-government.”  Ultimately, this
American right  is enshrined in the common law, the Constitution, and various laws including
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and its state-level equivalents.
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As our democratic institutions have become more complex, these rights have been expanded
over time to meet the challenges of increasing opacity. In the 1950s, as the number of executive
agencies grew, amassing unprecedented power with little direct accountability to the public,
Congress passed the FOIA over a presidential veto in order to ensure freedom of information.  As
recently as 2016, Congress echoed the importance of this view by passing an amendment to the
FOIA that “emphasizes in no uncertain terms . . . that the balance between the American
people’s right to know about their information and the government’s right to keep a secret shall
always be balanced in favor and presumed to be the American people’s right.”  In championing
this bill, Jason Cha etz, former chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform, speci cally highlighted the overuse and misapplication of FOIA Exemption 4, which
permits the government to withhold con dential business information.
Today, we are again at a moment when government has become even more complicated and
harder to hold accountable, as privately owned technology companies become inextricably
intertwined with federal, state, and local government actions. This corporate dominance is born
out of an ongoing trend of private intermingling with the administrative state.  In 2002, Martha
Minow, the former dean of Harvard Law School, wrote that “schools, prisons, welfare agencies,
and social service programs” are increasingly undergoing a process of privatization.  But what
was once a nascent trend has now grown into the status quo. As of 2015, over 40 percent of the
federal workforce was made up of contractors, many of which are primarily technology
companies.  And the services that these technology companies are providing are ever more core
to our democratic order and are thus intricately woven into the most intimate parts of our lives.
Technology companies’ algorithms determine “whether you get a job interview, how
much credit you access, and what news you see”  as well as the level of your health care
bene ts or whether you will be charged for a given crime.
As their structural power grows, these entities evade public scrutiny in how they carry out
government functions, a situation that carries a potential for enormous negative consequences.
Little is known about how these companies collaborate with and advise the government in part
as a result of their fervent insistence that their actions remain in the private realm. Companies
that contract with the government are a orded signi cant privacy in carrying out government
tasks through various trade secret and con dential business information exemptions to public
records laws, preventing public accountability over government processes and power.  In some
cases, the companies themselves are le  in the dark about how their technology is employed by
the government.  In response, this article suggests that the right of access should reach beyond
algorithms  to all areas of corporate governance through which government functions are
in uenced, controlled, or dominated by private technology companies.
This proposal echoes a solution to a Gilded Age debate over whether the principles of democracy
demand that transparency rights be extended to private industry.  Over a century ago,
philosopher John Dewey  rst argued that as the Industrial Age introduced new, complex, and
hidden technologies into society, better education about these systems was necessary to the
functioning of democracy. Dewey initially proposed this as a pedagogical theory in his work
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Borrowing from Dewey, this article argues that similar technological transparency is necessary in
what some have called our new Gilded Age,  as technology companies have grown to occupy a
quasi-governmental role in society, directly impacting individuals’ civil rights and civil liberties
and controlling other key government functions. As we shall see, these companies have become
not only the primary in uencers over online speech but also integral agents in the functioning of
the criminal justice system, the military, and even international diplomacy. A right of access is
necessary to balance these structural changes in institutional power. And while other proposals
to increase tech companies’ accountability through taxes, regulations, antitrust enforcement, or
 duciary obligations  are helpful, an expanded right of access remains the most basic and most
necessary  x that could assist all other reforms.
To make the case, this paper will  rst describe how technology companies are increasingly
acting as quasi-government institutions. Next, it will de ne the roots and parameters of the right
of access as well as a short explanation of Dewey’s original notion of technological transparency.
The  nal section will take up the case that particular democratic principles especially require
considering expanding the right of access to technology companies.
I. Silicon Valley Companies: The Call for Transparency in the New Towns
Nobody seriously doubts that the titans of “Big Tech” have begun to dominate our lives.  Over
the past two decades, several Silicon Valley companies have become extremely powerful in
controlling speech.  Re ecting that reality, Facebook decided this past year to create a new
“Supreme Court” of speech, a body of forty salaried judges who will work part time for three
years and who will have the ability to rule on Facebook’s hard cases to determine whether or not
to delete certain information. Academics like Kate Klonick  and Jack Balkin  have written about
the growing power these media giants wield over speech and have suggested various
accountability measures such as treating these new governors as information  duciaries with
certain obligations.  However, the power these companies exert extends well beyond the sphere
of speech. Amazon, which surpassed a trillion dollars in market value (second only to Apple) in
2018, currently o ers a variety of tools to local law enforcement agencies around the country and
has recently captured 46 percent of online shopping in addition to delivering packages and
acting as a credit lender, a producer of content, and a leading provider of cloud server space.
Facebook has established a market value of more than $600 billion and has faced scrutiny for its
improper in uence in the 2016 election and its more recent decision to create its own currency.
Google, one of the world’s greatest aggregators of personal data, has become heavily involved in
providing tools for the Department of Defense and has access to highly granular information
about our daily lives.
To a large extent, these companies are acting as quasi-sovereigns—through their sheer scale and
breadth—wielding power over multiple important aspects of our lives; and just likeany other
government entity, they should be held accountable by making their information public. For
instance, it is well acknowledged among scholars, lawyers, and journalists  that through
algorithmic choices, technology companies are transforming public life  in completely novel
ways compared to other industries.  Some thinkers predicted the emergence of this new form of
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clearly presaged that a new “sovereignty” would arise on the internet.  And while academics
like Je rey Sachs have long warned the public about the rise of “corporatocracy,”  Silicon Valley
companies have several unique properties that demand a need for transparency rights to apply
to them.
A. Technology Companies That Exercise Government-Like Control and Functions Should Be
Subject to the Same Accountability Measures
Silicon Valley companies wield power over the most intimate parts of our lives,  including
having the ability to in uence our identities and customs,  a notable capacity at a moment
when our allegiances to cultural traditions, religion,  and uni ed visions of a nation state are
waning.  In some cases, the government is relying on external companies to also control
sensitive identifying information like Social Security numbers  and medical records, and the
government has even relied on private vendors to issue government-backed credentials.  In his
book The Black Box Society, Frank Pasquale has written aptly about the control Big Tech’s
algorithms wield over our lives, describing how “credit raters, search engines, major banks, and
the TSA take in data about us and convert it into scores, rankings, risk calculations and watch
lists” that further categorize us in ways that shapes our identity.  Recent news articles have also
observed secret Facebook groups that have provided forums for police o cers and Customs and
Border Protection agents around the country to cultivate extremist mindsets showing the power
of these tools to – if not intentionally then passively – incubate certain persuasions and group
thinking in the ways that quasi-government actors o en do.
Second, these companies wield power over the most basic and traditional functions of
government. These range from in uencing the development of transportation systems  to
restructuring banking functions (through apps like Venmo)  to hosting public information and
serving ads that in uence elections  to providing for the nation’s physical safety. As an
example, several Silicon Valley companies are working closely with Department of Defense and
local law enforcement agencies  to provide surveillance and technological tools  like facial
recognition systems,  license plate readers,  and police body cameras.  Amazon Rekognition,
to name one such tool, is used by the CIA as well as state governments to detect objects, scenes,
and faces,  even though the tool has been found to employ inappropriate gender and ethnic
biases.  Palantir’s Gotham service, to name another, is used by three hundred California cities
(collectively home to about 7.9 million people) through the Department of Homeland Security to
assist local law enforcement via the use of surveillance tools that supposedly attempt to predict
crimes.  These tools have in some ways supplanted the most essential government function of
police power - the capacity of the state to enforce laws and regulate behavior.
Third, unlike other private entities, these companies are unique in that they provide multiple
government functions at once, making transparency simultaneously more important and more
di cult. Tech companies can build tools and programs for schools, banks, aeronautical
companies, and the police all at the same time. Amazon, for instance, provides storage for many
government records in “the cloud,”  o ers law enforcement tools,  and provides credit.
Facebook has experimented with building planes and drones,  exerts powerful force over our
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technology reporter John Roose has observed, the companies’ operations are “sort of fractal . . .
there are ten di erent parts of [the company] that you don’t understand at all. . . . And so that
makes it very hard to create a uni ed theory of [these companies] and how [they] work.”  The
need for accountability increases in cases like these where institutions carry out multiple
government functions at once.
It is also clear that e orts to ensure accountability and transparency from these companies have
not kept pace with their expansion into areas traditionally controlled by, or at least regulated by,
government. Several companies o er services allowing users to pay each other online, Amazon is
a credit lender, and Facebook plans to create a currency, but none of these companies are
regulated in the way that  nancial service companies are. They build tools to assist in posting
job advertisements, scouting talent, and  lling vacant positions, but the algorithms they create
are not subject to employment laws.  They assist law enforcement  with surveillance and
incarceration  but are not treated like police.
Last and perhaps more symbolically, tech giants have also taken on the emblematic role of quasi-
state actors. While presidents have o en conferred with powerful corporate actors over
particular subjects, it has seldom been the case that a single industry has held sway over so
many di erent facets of politics from trade to defense  and even, some say, exerting ideological
sway over the decisions of a sitting president.  Beyond the national arena, Silicon Valley
companies have taken a seat at the international stage.  In December 2015, the EU launched a
multi-stakeholder Internet Forum where representatives from Facebook, Microso , Twitter, and
YouTube sat alongside ministers from EU states to begin negotiating a voluntary code of conduct
on terrorist content and hate speech online.  Representatives of several foreign powers have
made the journey to Silicon Valley to speak with the modern sovereigns; an ambassador from
Denmark arrived in Silicon Valley with a letter from the Danish queen  ; and Germany, France,
and Slovakia have all recently appointed “digital ambassadors.”   It is safe to assert that some
important international bodies now regard Big Tech concerns as quasi-sovereign entities.
B. Why Technological Transparency Is the Solution
Given Silicon Valley’s ever-growing in uence over government, various scholars have discussed
how to neutralize this asymmetrical power structure by arguing for various accountability
measures. Much of this conversation is concerned with regulating Silicon Valley’s power over
speech. For instance, Professor Edward Lee has suggested a “hybrid agency” that would oversee
various takedown requests.  Professor Jody Freeman  has argued—in an argument that
parallels one I have made  —that the companies’ roles as information agencies should trigger
certain legislative restrictions. Perhaps the most alluring model is that of Jonathan Zittrain and
Jack Balkin,  who assert that social media companies are information  duciaries, like lawyers
and doctors, and therefore should be held to higher standards of loyalty and care around speech
as well as privacy.  Some have persuasively argued for the return of a strong antitrust regime.
While many of these models are convincing, applying any of them alone without a foundational
right of access would be incomplete. Many of these models even admit that more transparency is
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hold Silicon Valley companies accountable for their control of information that extends far
beyond the realm of speech forums.  The extension of the First Amendment right of access to
certain corporate proceedings and records of technology companies would uniquely account for
these companies’ increasingly unchecked in uence over various realms of government in a way
that the aforementioned proposals do not. For instance, while the information  duciary model is
limited to the “special relationships between companies and the people,”  the right of access is
made available to all persons, not only those who have opted to agree to a site’s terms of service,
in the same way that the FOIA is available to all citizens. Moreover, demanding a more robust
transparency framework speaks to the public distrust in many of the tech giants, particularly
a er repeated revelations of corporate misconduct.  Where the  duciary model is based on
“trust,”  the right of access model appropriately matches the skepticism that tech giants deserve
to be confronted with as they wield their (ever-increasing) asymmetrical power in complex and
secret operations and have been shown to abuse the public trust.  If it was ever appropriate to
accord companies like Facebook and YouTube the bene t of the doubt in such weighty a airs,
those days are surely in the past. Unlike the information- duciary model that could be used to
shelter abusive and manipulative corporate behavior, a robust transparency would not have the
same limitation.  As Justice Brandeis famously said, “sunlight is the best of disinfectants.”
II. Roots of the Right of Access
The right of access is rooted in the philosophy that because citizens are the ultimate sovereigns,
they must be able to access information necessary to hold government accountable.  As David
Arcadia notes, this principle “underlies the First Amendment’s structural role as a facilitator of
democratic control.”  While the First Amendment is thought to primarily protect speech,
scholars have o en considered the right to free speech as a complementary component to the
Amendment’s “larger commitment to transparency.”  As First Amendment scholar Robert Post
has stated, democratic legitimization “requires that government action be tethered to public
opinion. . . . It is for this reason that First Amendment coverage presumptively extends to all
communications that form public opinion” and by contrast “[a] state that controls our
knowledge controls our minds.”  Or, as free speech scholar Vincent Blasi has argued, the
general populace must  rst be privy to the behavior of its rulers in order to judge them.  In
essence, we need access to information that impacts our lives in order to make meaningful
decisions about democracy.
The tenets underlying the right of access are rooted as far back as the seventeenth century in the
English judicial system, predating the formation of the United States. As the Supreme Court has
noted, under English common law, public access to court proceedings was “the rule in England
from time immemorial.”  English courts consistently held that one could access government
records where such access would bene t the public.  Under that reasoning, a member of the
public was permitted to inspect government documents and claim that right in situations where
records would bene t litigation.  Eventually, British courts would construe access to
information even more broadly. For instance, some British courts found that, once a document
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Early American courts quickly adopted and expanded this practice.  In the early United States,
courts held that the attorney general could bring a suit to access non-judicial records on behalf
of the public; some jurisdictions within the United States recognized an even broader right of
access by allowing the citizen to bring the case in his or her own name.  Eventually suits
became allowed in most circumstances where litigation might expose a public wrongdoing or
help monitor government functions.  In 1978, in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., the
Supreme Court  rmly held that the right of access applies to both public records and court
records.
Today, the First Amendment’s broad and presumptive right of access is hard to overcome even
where privacy and proprietary interests are asserted. Parties advocating for withholding must
show speci c negative e ects—in particular, a privacy harm to an individual or the disclosure of
con dential business information.  For instance, access to records can be restricted in cases
involving a rape, family dispute, or sexual crime in order to protect the privacy of the victims and
especially the minors involved.  But even in those highly invasive cases, courts have found that
redactions or other remedies may be su cient.
Similarly, courts have routinely found that corporate parties asserting “commercial interests”
cannot overcome the presumptive right of access. In a 2005 federal court case, the defendant, a
chain of grocery stores argued that sealing was necessary because disclosure of business records
would put the company at a “competitive disadvantage” and harm their future negotiating
position with labor unions.  The court rejected these arguments, explaining that it would not
“speculate” about how the company might be a ected “at some point in the future in an
unidenti ed labor dispute.”  Similarly, in a case involving Apple, another federal court struck
down assertions that records must remain under seal where they “re ect internal Apple
processes and deliberations that Apple regards as highly con dential.”  The court wrote, “the
mere fact that the publication of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment or exposure to
further litigation is not su cient to meet the ‘compelling reasons’ standard.”
While courts will sometimes concede to trade secret justi cations for withholding documents,
even those concerns may be outweighed where the public interest mitigates in favor of
disclosure.  In a recent case I litigated to access court records involving Facebook’s “friendly
fraud” program (aimed at taking advantage of children who were unaware of the charges
imposed by platform); the court ordered disclosure of the records, overruling Facebook’s
claims that disclosure “would put Facebook at an unfair competitive disadvantage in dealing
with its partners and competitors.”  The court found that “Facebook provided no speci c
support for the argument that revenue  gures from nearly  ve years ago would impact current
partnerships or provide undue advantage to its competitors” and “[b]y contrast, this information
would be of great public interest.”
Relatedly, the Supreme Court has suggested that the right of access may also extend to other
nontraditional “institutions,” if the e ect of the extension would encourage trust of government
among citizens.  In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, the seminal case on access to court
records, Chief Justice Warren Burger, writing for the majority, asserted, “People in an open
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what they are prohibited from observing.”  This key statement appears to imply that the right
of access, which has been continually expanding over time, could apply to other,
nongovernmental institutions, such as technology companies, particularly where those
institutions are closely linked to providing government functions.
In determining whether to expand the First Amendment right of access to an untested area,
courts today apply the well-known “experience and logic” test. The two-part test asks (1)
“whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and general public” and
(2) “whether public access plays a signi cant positive role in the functioning of the particular
process in question.”  If both of these questions are answered in the a rmative, the
constitutional right of access applies.  The right may be overcome only if denying access is
necessary to serve a “compelling government interest” and if the limitation of the public’s right
of access is “narrowly tailored to serve” that interest.   
Applying this test to technology companies would be admittedly di cult. Most obviously, there
is no historical precedent for directly expanding the right of access to institutions outside
government. However, several factors lean in favor of such expansion. First, and most important,
courts have long underscored that “[h]istory has taught us that secrecy and lack of access to
information allows for abuses of power”  and that the right of access aptly applies in
circumstances of consolidated power. Additionally, the right of access is commonly applied to
circumstances where other avenues for accountability are lacking. Therefore the fact that
technology companies’ obfuscation around data collection cannot be improved by other regimes
like notice-and-choice or even more robust comment procedures leans in favor of expansion.
Last, courts have also expanded the right of access to institutions outside the judicial system,
such as administrative bodies, particularly those that have a large impact on the public’s rights,
similar to technology companies. In considering whether to apply the right to these new
sovereigns, we may consider the extent to which these companies exercise unusual in uence
over the citizenry, have a pronounced history of secrecy, and lack public accountability.
In arguing for this expansion, we may also return to the writing of John Dewey, who, like other
American progressives at the turn of the twentieth century, argued that technological
transparency was necessary to a healthy democracy.  Re ecting on the rapid industrialization
taking place in America  Dewey argued for more transparency in order to expose how emerging
technologies controlled political decisions occurring every day. In his 1899 book School and
Society, Dewey wrote how the drastic change from rural to industrial life had obscured many
quotidian but elemental processes in everyday life:
Instead of pressing a button and  ooding the house with electric light, the whole process of
getting illumination was followed in its toilsome length from the killing of the animal and the
trying of fat to the making of wicks and dipping of candles. The supply of  our, of lumber, of
foods, of building materials, of household furniture, even of metal ware, of nails, hinges,
hammers, etc. was produced in the immediate neighborhood, in shops which were constantly
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While citizens of rural America could easily understand the technologies that underpinned their
daily lives, during the Industrial Revolution that knowledge quickly disappeared. Dewey
exclaimed, “How many of the employed are today mere appendages to the machines which they
operate!”  It seems that similar exclamations about the “smart” technology used by
government in ways that directly impact our lives and safety could be made in the present day as
well.
Though it may be hard to envision courts expanding the right of access to private actors, Dewey
foresaw the potential for this a century ago when he argued for holding public and private actors
accountable. In Dewey’s later work The Public and Its Problems,  he theorized that certain
powerful institutions bene ted from obfuscation and that, due to the key roles they play in
governance, these private elite actors must be checked by some transparency. “Representative
government must at least seem to be founded on public interests as they are revealed to public
belief,” wrote Dewey.  Worried about concerns over propaganda, he continued, “[t]he
smoothest road to control of political conduct is by control of opinion.”
As long as interests of pecuniary pro t are powerful, and a public has not located and identi ed
itself, those who have this interest will have an unresisted motive for tampering with the springs
of political action in all that a ects them. Just as in the conduct of industry and exchange
generally the technological factor is obscured, de ected and defeated by “business,” so
speci cally in the management of publicity.
It is not enough, Dewey would seem to argue, to limit the public’s right to know to strictly
traditional governmental actors, since government is not the only sector of civil society that can
be held responsible for the nation’s actions. For a democracy to stay healthy, powerful private
actors—especially corporations—must operate with a degree of transparency.
III. Expanding the Right of Access
Considering the quasi-governmental role of Silicon Valley companies, various state action
theories may help extend the right of access to these entities. While select courts have concluded
that private companies like Facebook do not qualify as state actors and are not bound by the
First Amendment,  various theories justify the application of constitutional and statutory
transparency rights.
A. The Company Town Theory
The Supreme Court has previously created multiple tests for determining whether extending First
Amendment obligations to corporate actors is justi ed, each aiming to determine whether the
corporate actor’s behavior amounts to state action.  The four main tests are: (1) the public
function test  ; (2) the joint action test  ; (3) the state compulsion test  ; and (4) the
governmental nexus test.  Ultimately, these tests are all fact-bound inquiries that o en
conclude that if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it is a duck; the more a corporate
action appears to be a state action, the more likely it is one. Ultimately, these tests a rm the
same thing, that there is some measure of corporate entanglement that creates a need for
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forum for the exercise of First Amendment rights,” and so the fact that a corporate entity holds
title to that space, historically reserved for government, does not diminish its character as a
public domain.  Applying that rule, the Court has held that a private park operator is subject to
the Fourteenth Amendment because a park is municipal in character.  But the state action
doctrine not only applies to “traditional public forums,” such as streets or parks  ; the Court
has also extended it to “designated public forums,” or nontraditional spaces that open
“channel[s] of communication”  and that “share essential attributes of a traditional public
forum.”
Many social media companies arguably satisfy multiple of these tests, serving as the modern
public parks and public forums in addition to providing multiple other traditional public
functions.  While no court has ever explicitly held that a social media company is a public
actor, the Supreme Court has suggested a willingness to consider this as a viable theory. In
Packingham v. North Carolina, a case striking down a North Carolina statute prohibiting
registered sex o enders from accessing social networking websites, the Court in dicta equated
social media sites to modern-day parks and streets, signaling that these companies take on
responsibilities when they host a space of public activity. In that vein, some lower courts have
held that social media pages have quali ed as “public forums” where government exercises
particular control over certain accounts.  Today, when 70 percent of Americans  access social
media sites on a daily basis to engage in behaviors that would have traditionally occurred on our
sidewalks, parks, and street corners, it is fair to say that these sites are participating in state
action.
This argument is only further compounded by the recent development of many such titans
functioning as more than just public forums, expanding into real-life “company towns.”
Facebook, Amazon, and Google have all begun building housing, grocery stores, retail districts,
and hotels in their respective Silicon Valley cities of Palo Alto, San Jose, and Mountain View as
well as other cities across the country.  “By 2021, Facebook is scheduled to complete Willow
Park, a corporate campus with 1,500 housing units, retail, a hotel, and grassy plazas in Menlo
Park, California.”  At the same time, these companies are providing multiple government
functions on the national level, including defense tools, banking features, and speech forums as
well as modes of transit, as previously mentioned. Writing on a blog, Professor Ruthann Robson
has recently argued for this position, citing Marsh v. Alabama,  the landmark Supreme Court
case that found that private companies that provide multiple government functions are bound by
First Amendment obligations. Robson’s proposal for “arguments extending the Marsh company-
town holding”  is increasingly apropos as media companies “perform[] the full spectrum of
municipal powers.”
Lastly, expanding the state action doctrine to these companies would align with the First
Amendment’s right of the listeners. As Professor Helen Norton has written, the “law sometimes .
. . puts listeners’ interests  rst in settings where those listeners have less information or power
than speakers.”  O en described as the listener’s right to receive information, this doctrine is
usually raised to support the right of access to media outlets in cases involving newsworthy
information.  The fundamental idea in such instances is that when space is limited, access
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those who can squeeze through the door?”  As scholar RonNell Anderson Jones has written “[a]
recognition of [the listener approach] drives the growing movement to consider how listener
rights might have distinct legal force.”  It permits the government to regulate the speech of
comparatively knowledgeable or powerful speakers when that expression frustrates their
listeners.  Under this approach, certain situations would justify favoring listeners, such as
social media users, over speakers, such as social media companies, that engage in noisy and
coercive algorithmic speech.  
B. Beyond Providing Fora: Controlling the New Corporate Towns’ Governors
The structural directive of the First Amendment also supports expanding the right of access to
social media companies.  As Justice William Brennan explained, “the First Amendment . . . has
a structural role to play in securing and fostering our republican system of self-government.”
“[S]tructuralist” strategies “limit the underlying powers and capacities” of powerful institutions
in contrast to “prophylactic rules” that depend on “ ne-tuning expert management.”
Expanding the right of access is seemingly a banal solution to those who challenge the e cacy of
transparency rights, but in terms of shi ing power structures it is a radical move.  Instead of
behaving with deference to social media companies, this framework introduces disruption which
is necessary for accountability and may at least slightly pull back the tide of the Lochner-ization
of the First Amendment  by redistributing the economic power of knowledge back to the
public. In particular, the right of access, if expanded, could bring light to at least three areas of
public life where technology companies enshroud information with secrecy anathema to our
democractic values.
1. Access to Technology Records Involving Criminal Justice System
Access to information within the criminal justice system has always been viewed “at the core of
First Amendment.”  For this reason courts have gradually expanded the right beyond criminal
trials, to voir dire proceedings, suppression hearings, and due process and entrapment hearings.
 Today, technology companies play instrumental roles in our criminal justice system,
assisting the police, prosecutors, attorneys, and even judges with making crucial decisions that
a ect a person’s freedom. Judges o en directly rely on risk assessment algorithms and other
technological tools to decide crucial questions of criminal justice in pretrial detention, bail,
sentencing,  and parole.  While companies making these technological tools claim they
facilitate more neutral decision-making, these tools have been shown to be susceptible to
various forms of bias.  For instance, in 2016, ProPublica released an investigation showing the
racial bias within COMPAS, an algorithm used by law enforcement agencies to assess risk.
According to ProPublica, African-American defendants were incorrectly  agged as future
criminals twice as frequently as non-African-American ones.  In circumstances like these,
technological tools integrally impact choices in the criminal justice system traditionally le  to
government actors, leading to the obvious conclusion that courts should expand the right of
access to this information.  While e orts to access information held by so ware developers are
o en met with claims that the information is proprietary or constitutes a protected trade secret,


















8/3/2020 Keeping the New Governors Accountable: Expanding the First Amendment Right of Access to Silicon Valley | Knight First Amendment Institute
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/keeping-the-new-governors-accountable-expanding-the-first-amendment-right-of-access-to-silicon-valley 12/25
2. Access to Technology Records Involving Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Beyond law enforcement, algorithms and other technological tools have been used in decisions
over whether to grant or deny a variety of other government bene ts and civil rights and civil
liberties. For instance, algorithms have been used in rationing healthcare.  In one case, a court
found that a state’s allotment of Medicaid – based on an algorithm – was so unreliable that it
“arbitrarily deprive[d] participants of their property rights and hence violate[d] due process.”
Similarly, public school teachers have been evaluated through privately developed so ware.
There, the court wrote, “teachers have no meaningful way to ensure correct calculation of their
[evaluation] scores, and as a result are unfairly subject to mistaken deprivation of
constitutionally protected property interests in their jobs.”  In cases involving due process as
well as other rights and liberties, it is uniquely important that the right of access apply to ensure
protections such as impartial adjudication as well as judicial review.
3. Access to Technology Records Mirroring Administrative or Judicial Bodies
Similarly, the right of access should also be expanded where technology companies create
institutions that reproduce judiciary functions. Traditionally, the right of access has applied to a
bounty of legal proceedings, including suppression hearings, bail hearings, and sentencing
hearings as well as a plethora of court records such as indictments, motion documents, and
criminal cases, among many others.  Moreover, this right was eventually expanded to other
court-like bodies outside the judicial system, such as the executive branch’s judicial review
board proceedings, federal administrative fact- nding hearings, state legislative meetings, city
council meetings, and governor's executive travel records. This past year, Facebook announced a
“Global Oversight Board,” a Supreme Court–like body that will determine what speech on its
platform may be censored. Expanding the right of access to the records and trial-like hearings of
this type of judicial body determining core speech rights would appropriately fall in line with the
structural demands of the First Amendment.
IV. Conclusion
As companies increase their control over our lives and our society, expanding the right of access
is increasingly important. A constitutional guarantee of access to certain records and
information held by technology companies would mark a signi cant step forward in checking
the increasing power of these companies over people’s lives and over our democracy as a whole.
While the passage of new FOIA-like legislation would also be appropriate,  particularly to
address the growing number of cases where the government tries to use Exemption 4 (trade
secrets or con dential commercial information) to avoid disclosure requirements,  this article
has aimed to further the debate over how to transform our “black-box society” back into a
democratic one. By employing a broader application of the right to access to technology
companies we can assure more democratic stability in an institutional infrastructure of
increasing asymmetry.
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Leader, a case which will only further make government information in the hands of Silicon Valley di cult to access
under FOIA. See, e.g., Will Evans, We Sued the Government for Silicon Valley Diversity Data, Reveal (Apr. 26, 2018)
https://www.revealnews.org/blog/we-sued-the-government-for-silicon-valley-diversity-data/.
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